Kumar Ayush

A policy brief written from India's perspective for an International Relations course at The Takshashila Institution. The simulation posits a Taiwan Strait conflict at a time when India is already strained by a simultaneous Strait of Hormuz crisis. The full brief can be downloaded here.

The summary below is AI-generated from the submitted work.

Threats and Exposure

Economy. A broader Taiwan Strait conflict threatens South China Sea trade routes — roughly half of India's trade by volume. The strategic exposure is to semiconductor supply chains. More immediately, the active Hormuz crisis has already forced India onto alternative petroleum suppliers, with Russia filling much of the gap under a temporary sanctions waiver. That waiver is trivially threatened if India is seen to take sides.

Defence. There is no direct military threat to India, but our position at the Great Nicobar islands creates an informal obligation. The Indo-Pacific programme identifies uninterrupted Malacca Strait trade as a priority, and the naval base at Great Nicobar was built with that interest stated. Separately, Pakistan and China — military allies — are both actors in this conflict, making any assumption of a "distracted China" dangerous. A Taiwan escalation could be an opportune moment for either to probe India's contested borders.

Diplomatic. India wishes to maintain neutrality, but the boundary between neutrality and irrelevancy is thin. The US is likely to read non-cooperation as adversarial. China will read any US assistance as a breach of India's formal position on Taiwan. The tension is structural.

India's Options

Strengthen border posture. Reinforcing our border positions is defensible — it is not offensive, it is anticipatory given that China's military attention is divided. The diplomatic risk of being called opportunistic is manageable: we are defending national interest on all borders, not targeting Chinese lines specifically. China's military options in response are limited to raising presence — which was the anticipated scenario anyway.

Stall, absorb, and diversify. The Hormuz crisis gives India a consistent diplomatic line: economic drain from an active energy-security crisis impairs our ability to commit to a second conflict. We should clarify that LEMOA access to Andaman and Nicobar bases is available for humanitarian aid, not combat operations — consistent with acting as a responsible, neutral party in the Indian Ocean. If the US escalates economically in response (sanctions, technology transfer blocks, labour mobility barriers), this is an escalation on an existing front, not a new one. Our action space remains "absorb and diversify," which is a politically coherent position.

Energy security is the prime directive. Maintaining a consistent diplomatic stance is the next. Technological needs can be diversified, and relationships can be repaired. An injured player cannot play a match that could cause a permanent injury.